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Mr_america
2024/10/20 15:36
Native restaking 🥩
A native restaker is an Ethereum PoS validator that restakes their 32 ETH to
Native restaking 🥩
A native restaker is an Ethereum PoS validator that restakes their 32 ETH to operate Eigenlayer AVSs. Native restakers are awarded AVS fees in exchange for their service, but are subject to penalties if they break the AVS's rules. To engage in native restaking, validators must point their withdrawal credentials to an EigenPod contract which then opts-in to restaking and chooses its AVSs.
Native restaking allows validators to better utilize their ETH capital and hardware to supplement their PoS rewards. However, the 32 ETH requirement is too high a barrier for most to participate. Additionally, some AVSs may require far greater computational requirements than what is expected from PoS. Puffer aims to address this through its PufferModules.
Puffer Modules 🐡$PUFFER
At its core, the Puffer protocol is a collection of PufferModule contracts. Each module controls an EigenPod that functions as a single native restaker but is composed of many NoOp-controlled validators.
Modules are filled with the validators of NoOps whose sole job is to perform Ethereum PoS validation. The validators' ETH is then restaked and used as collateral for EigenLayer AVSs. During Puffer's initial phase, the responsibility of operating the AVSs is delegated to a DAO-chosen restaking operator (ReOp), who provides the service in exchange for a portion of the generated AVS fees.
The protocol decides which AVSs the modules are assigned, allowing restaked ETH to be allocated to AVSs according to the protocol's risk preferences. Given the delegation risk, the NoOps are awarded commission on the AVS fees with the rest returned to the protocol, helping grow the value of pufETH. This allows NoOps with less than 2 ETH to earn rewards from native restaking.
Restaking Operators
Restaking Operators (ReOps) are operators whose job is to perform all the required AVS duties on behalf of a given restaking module. ReOps may also be NoOps within their own or other modules. ReOps are expected to perform well to maximize restaking rewards for their own benefit and that of the NoOps in their module and pufETH holders downstream. In the Puffer protocol, ReOps operate through RestakingOperator contracts, which allows governance to decide their AVS selections through the PufferModuleManager contract.
Joining a module 👈
To hold strong to our alignment with Ethereum's ethos, it is always permissionless for NoOps to join a module and deploy an Ethereum validator.
To join, NoOps lock 1 or 2 ETH collateral and lock validator tickets, which represent a long-term commitment to run a validator in the module. Their collateral is then locked as pufETH and they are provisioned 32 ETH to deploy their validator to the module's EigenPod contract.
The NoOp is now entitled to keep all of the PoS rewards (consensus and execution) generated by their validator. The NoOps that joined PufferModules will also receive restaking rewards.
Restaking risks and mitigations 🚧
The concept of restaking, while promising, introduces certain inherent risks to stakers and NoOps alike. These primarily revolve around the vulnerabilities of smart contracts and potential AVS slashing risks.
Through the sustainable rewards that it can offer, restaking can reshape the dynamics of the liquid staking market, which is currently on a dangerous path towards complete centralization.
Restricting ReOps
To ensure a safe transition into the world of restaking, Puffer will rely more heavily on governance to decide restaking qualifications during its nascent stages. During this time, only reputable ReOps with excellent performance that have been selected through governance will be eligible to operate the AVSs on behalf of a given module.
As Eigenlayer, AVSs, and Puffer’s anti-slashing mechanisms mature, proven NoOps will have the option to become ReOps without DAO-approval.
Restricting AVSs
As an open platform, EigenLayer allows anyone to deploy an AVS. Thus, allowing PufferModules to service any AVS would expose the stakers and NoOps to too much slashing risk.
To mitigate this risk, Puffer requires the DAO to onboard new modules, carefully vet the allowed AVSs, and manage the allocation of modules to AVSs.
Validator Tickets
Validator Tickets are the evolution to Puffer's initial "Smoothing Commitment" research collaboration with Justin Drake, and are closely related to the recent "Execution Tickets" proposal that was added to Ethereum's roadmap.
Overview
The idea is simple but powerful:
pufETH: People stake their ETH and receive pufETH, a token representing their staked ETH within the Puffer protocol, which is used to fund Ethereum validators.
Validator Tickets (VTs): VTs are ERC20 tokens that grant the holder the right to run a staker-funded Ethereum validator for a day. VTs are minted by ETH deposits. This ETH goes towards compensating pufETH holders for financing validators.
Running Validators: To run a validator, a node operator must lock VTs and lock in 1 ETH of pufETH as collateral.
Pricing VTs: The price of a VT is set based on the expected daily earnings from running a validator. This price directly influences the expected pufETH APR.
Benefits: VTs create new trading opportunities, address “rug-pooling”, and incentivize good performance. pufETH holders earn rewards immediately when VTs are purchased. Consuming VTs allows the node operator to keep 100% of the validator’s earnings.
The status quo
Typically, Liquid Staking Protocols (LSPs) use two methods for validators:
Unbonded Model: Validators don't need to lock up collateral. This is good for growth but risky because penalties affect the staking pool, and it often requires specially approved validators (permissioned / KYC).
Bonded Model: Validators lock collateral for their operation period. This method is more secure and allows for any validator to join, but slows LSP growth as it requires a large amount of ETH upfront per validator.
Puffer uses the bonded model as it is more ethos-aligned, but adds VTs to address some of its shortcomings.
How are VTs used?
Validator Tickets supplement validator bonds. When registering a validator, the NoOp locks 1 ETH worth of pufETH as a bond and deposits at least 28 VTs.
In exchange, they are allocated 32 ETH to run a validator, and are entitled to 100% of the Proof of Stake (PoS) rewards they produce over as many days as VTs they've deposited. In other words, NoOps pay pufETH holders ETH upfront to run a validator.
Each VT represents one validator-day of expected Proof of Stake (PoS) rewards. The payments to mint VTs directly pay pufETH holders, creating strong growth dynamics. This mechanism is favorable for stakers, capital efficient, and incentivizes for optimal NoOp performance. Upon exiting a validator, the number of locked VT tokens, corresponding to the number of days the validator was active, will be burned and the remaining locked VTs may be retrieved by the NoOp.
Why? ~ NoOp Incentives
The success of an LSP largely depends upon the performance of its NoOps. Traditionally, having NoOps deposit collateral has been a method to ensure alignment with the protocol's objectives. The logic is simple: with a financial stake in play, NoOps have a deterrent against going offline, suffering slashing penalties, or engaging in nefarious activities like MEV theft ("rug-pooling"). If they were to engage in such activities, they'd stand to lose their collateral.
While this collateral approach discourages penalties, it does not strongly incentivize performance. For instance, a "lazy" NoOp could alternate between being online and offline, ensuring their validator balance stays at 32 ETH. This strategy results in no reward generation for the LSP, but also no collateral loss for the NoOp.
Puffer changes this incentive landscape through the use of VTs. Since NoOps have already purchased VTs, they stand to gain nothing from underperforming since they cannot recoup this initial payment (as days pass and their VTs are burned), even if they maintain their validator balance. Thus, for a NoOp to turn a profit, they must perform at least on par with the average validator. Those who excel can earn even more.
While VTs provide strong disincentives for slashing, to further protect the staker's ETH, Puffer requires a 1 or 2 ETH bond and for NoOps to use anti-slashing technology for defense-in-depth.
This new approach neatly tackles two traditional problems:
Rug-pooling: With NoOps entitled to all the MEV they generate, there's no longer a need to police or penalize them for rug-pooling.
Lazy NoOps: Since stakers get a proxy for PoS rewards upfront via minting VTs, they aren't adversely affected if a NoOp underperforms.
Requirements
For PoS stability and NoOp incentive alignment, 1 or 2 ETH worth of pufETH and a minimum of 28 VTs are required to be deposited at registration time. Their duration begins at the moment their validator is activated on the beacon chain, and each VT represents 1 day or 255 epochs.
Assuming they deposited 28 VTs, after 28 days of validating, the NoOp's validator will be automatically ejected, its 32 ETH returned to the protocol, and bond returned. If they wish to extend their duration, NoOps can deposit additional VTs at any time. NoOps who have Validators with unconsumed VTs (e.g deposited 100 VTs) may retrieve them from the protocol (e.g., 72 VTs).
Pricing Validator Tickets
Prices of Validator Tickets are secured and posted by RedStone Oracles. The VT Oracle module is fully automated and data is delivered every 12 hours or if the deviation is 10% on MEV payouts or 5% on consensus rewards. The contract can be seen on the ValidatorTicketPricer contract events page here. The pricing module is the heart of the properly functioning Puffer system. Puffer’s stability is based on the correctness of the price from RedStone.
Puffer Logo
Validator Tickets are Puffer's novel addition to the validator lifecycle in LSTs.
Validator Tickets are the evolution to Puffer's initial "Smoothing Commitment" research collaboration with Justin Drake, and are closely related to the recent "Execution Tickets" proposal that was added to Ethereum's roadmap.
Overview
Minting VTs
The idea is simple but powerful:
pufETH: People stake their ETH and receive pufETH, a token representing their staked ETH within the Puffer protocol, which is used to fund Ethereum validators.
Validator Tickets (VTs): VTs are ERC20 tokens that grant the holder the right to run a staker-funded Ethereum validator for a day. VTs are minted by ETH deposits. This ETH goes towards compensating pufETH holders for financing validators.
Running Validators: To run a validator, a node operator must lock VTs and lock in 1 ETH of pufETH as collateral.
Pricing VTs: The price of a VT is set based on the expected daily earnings from running a validator. This price directly influences the expected pufETH APR.
Benefits: VTs create new trading opportunities, address “rug-pooling”, and incentivize good performance. pufETH holders earn rewards immediately when VTs are purchased. Consuming VTs allows the node operator to keep 100% of the validator’s earnings.
tip
Before EigenLayer restaking is live, selling VTs is pufETH's source of rewards.
The status quo
Typically, Liquid Staking Protocols (LSPs) use two methods for validators:
Unbonded Model: Validators don't need to lock up collateral. This is good for growth but risky because penalties affect the staking pool, and it often requires specially approved validators (permissioned / KYC).
Bonded Model: Validators lock collateral for their operation period. This method is more secure and allows for any validator to join, but slows LSP growth as it requires a large amount of ETH upfront per validator.
Puffer uses the bonded model as it is more ethos-aligned, but adds VTs to address some of its shortcomings.
How are VTs used?
Using VTs
Validator Tickets supplement validator bonds. When registering a validator, the NoOp locks 1 ETH worth of pufETH as a bond and deposits at least 28 VTs.
In exchange, they are allocated 32 ETH to run a validator, and are entitled to 100% of the Proof of Stake (PoS) rewards they produce over as many days as VTs they've deposited. In other words, NoOps pay pufETH holders ETH upfront to run a validator.
tip
For stakers, this means the value of pufETH increases every time a VT is minted.
Each VT represents one validator-day of expected Proof of Stake (PoS) rewards. The payments to mint VTs directly pay pufETH holders, creating strong growth dynamics. This mechanism is favorable for stakers, capital efficient, and incentivizes for optimal NoOp performance. Upon exiting a validator, the number of locked VT tokens, corresponding to the number of days the validator was active, will be burned and the remaining locked VTs may be retrieved by the NoOp.
Why? ~ NoOp Incentives
The success of an LSP largely depends upon the performance of its NoOps. Traditionally, having NoOps deposit collateral has been a method to ensure alignment with the protocol's objectives. The logic is simple: with a financial stake in play, NoOps have a deterrent against going offline, suffering slashing penalties, or engaging in nefarious activities like MEV theft ("rug-pooling"). If they were to engage in such activities, they'd stand to lose their collateral.
While this collateral approach discourages penalties, it does not strongly incentivize performance. For instance, a "lazy" NoOp could alternate between being online and offline, ensuring their validator balance stays at 32 ETH. This strategy results in no reward generation for the LSP, but also no collateral loss for the NoOp.
Puffer changes this incentive landscape through the use of VTs. Since NoOps have already purchased VTs, they stand to gain nothing from underperforming since they cannot recoup this initial payment (as days pass and their VTs are burned), even if they maintain their validator balance. Thus, for a NoOp to turn a profit, they must perform at least on par with the average validator. Those who excel can earn even more.
While VTs provide strong disincentives for slashing, to further protect the staker's ETH, Puffer requires a 1 or 2 ETH bond and for NoOps to use anti-slashing technology for defense-in-depth.
This new approach neatly tackles two traditional problems:
Rug-pooling: With NoOps entitled to all the MEV they generate, there's no longer a need to police or penalize them for rug-pooling.
Lazy NoOps: Since stakers get a proxy for PoS rewards upfront via minting VTs, they aren't adversely affected if a NoOp underperforms.
Requirements
For PoS stability and NoOp incentive alignment, 1 or 2 ETH worth of pufETH and a minimum of 28 VTs are required to be deposited at registration time. Their duration begins at the moment their validator is activated on the beacon chain, and each VT represents 1 day or 255 epochs.
Assuming they deposited 28 VTs, after 28 days of validating, the NoOp's validator will be automatically ejected, its 32 ETH returned to the protocol, and bond returned. If they wish to extend their duration, NoOps can deposit additional VTs at any time. NoOps who have Validators with unconsumed VTs (e.g deposited 100 VTs) may retrieve them from the protocol (e.g., 72 VTs).
Pricing Validator Tickets
Prices of Validator Tickets are secured and posted by RedStone Oracles. The VT Oracle module is fully automated and data is delivered every 12 hours or if the deviation is 10% on MEV payouts or 5% on consensus rewards. The contract can be seen on the ValidatorTicketPricer contract events page here. The pricing module is the heart of the properly functioning Puffer system. Puffer’s stability is based on the correctness of the price from RedStone.
During Puffer's Phase 1, VT prices will be posted by the Guardians. The prices are calculated with the following formula, where
This capital-efficient approach means that barriers to entry are reduced, enabling a broader range of participants to contribute to securing the network without having to commit a full 32 ETH.
Fuels Growth: The VT model is a game-changer for LSPs. It ensures that the LSP continues to earn rewards even when the validator queue is long. In traditional setups, lengthy validator queues could stifle an LSP's ability to grow, but with VTs, this obstacle is greatly diminished.
No More Rug-Pooling Oversight: The previous need to constantly watch over and penalize rug-pooling activities added overhead and complexity that may only be solvable with in-protocol solutions like MEV-Burn. With NoOps entitled to 100% of the execution rewards they generate, this oversight becomes unnecessary, simplifying operations.
Addresses Lazy NoOps: Traditional bonded models do not fully disincentivize NoOps from denying the pool rewards by going offline frequently. With VTs, NoOps are naturally incentivized to perform their best since their upfront payment cannot be recouped through subpar performance.
Slash Resistant: With a combination of just 1 ETH collateral, favorable NoOp incentives, and Puffer's anti-slashing technology, the risk of staker ETH getting penalized from an irresponsible NoOp is considerably reduced.
MEV Lottery: NoOps can participate in the MEV lottery, an attractive proposition for many, without having to lock up 32 ETH. This opens the door for more NoOps to benefit from potential MEV gains, further incentivizing participation.$PUFFER